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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the entry of Summary Judgment 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
presiding. This court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2-3(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. 
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Statement of the Issues on Appeal 
1. Should the lower Court's ruling that the Appellee 
Phyllis Farrell is the widow and heir of the Decedent 
Russell Farrell be upheld? 
2. Have Appellants filed a frivolous appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Phyllis Farrell, the widow of the Decedent Russell S. 
Farrell, filed on August 22, 1990 in the probate court of 
the Third Judicial District Court a Petition for 
Determination of Heirs. The natural children of the 
Decedent filed an Objection to the Petition on the grounds 
that because a divorce action had been initiated, albeit 
not completed, before Farrell's death, Phyllis Farrell 
should not be considered the surviving spouse of the 
Decedent. Phyllis Farrell moved for Summary Judgment on 
this issue with a supporting affidavit. Appellants failed 
to file supporting affidavits for the allegations and 
arguments made in their Memorandum in Opposition. After a 
very brief oral argument, the Trial Court ruled that 
Phyllis Farrell was legally and lawfully married to 
Russell S. Farrell at the time of his death and was, 
therefore, the Decedent's widow and heir. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Phyllis and Russell Farrell met in 1975. (R. 
51). 
2. Phyllis and Russell Farrell were married on April 
22, 1978 (R. 51). 
3. Russell Farrell died on August 15, 1989 while 
working on a fishing vessel off of the coast of Valdez, 
Alaska. (R. 51). 
4. A Decree of Divorce, Civil No D89-1198, was 
entered on August 21, 1989 because Phyllis Farrell had not 
yet been contacted concerning the death of her husband. 
5. The Decree of Divorce was set aside and vacated 
on October 2, 1989 upon the motion of Mrs. Farrell. (R. 
52) 
6. The only purported Will of Russell Farrell which 
has been identified was executed on the 18th of February, 
1965 (R. 52). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellee Phyllis Farrell is the widow and heir of 
the decedent Russell S. Farrell. They were legally 
married at the time of the decedent's death. Although the 
Appellee had filed a Complaint, there was no final order 
of any kind in place when the decedent died. The law in 
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Utah, and generally in the country, is that a divorce 
proceeding abates upon the death of a party• Further, the 
Divorce Decree that was mistakenly entered after the death 
of the decedent is void and without effect. 
The Appellants' appeal is without basis in law or in 
fact, and is, therefore, frivolous. Accordingly, Appellee 
is entitled to an award for damages and for her attorneys 
fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
.1. 
PHYLLIS FARRELL IS THE WIDOW OF RUSSELL FARRELL 
Phyllis Farrell was legally married to Russell 
Farrell at the time of his death; neither party disputes 
the fact that there was no final decree of divorce in 
place. However, the children of the decedent argue that 
because a divorce decree was entered after Farrell's 
death, such decree should somehow be applied retroactively 
or that the Stipulation signed by Russell Farrell should 
be considered a final order. 
The general rule of law to be applied in this matter 
is discussed at 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation, 
Section 176: 
"A cause of action for a divorce is purely personal, 
and it has been held that such a cause of action 
terminates on the death of either spouse; and if an 
action for a divorce is commenced, and one of the 
parties dies thereafter, but before the entry of the 
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final decree, the action abates. The judicial power 
is ended when a party dies before the entry of a 
decree; if the court thereafter grants a divorce in 
ignorance of the death of a party the decree is 
void..." 
The law in Utah has followed the general rule. 
In Daly v. Daly, 553 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court followed the general rule and held that a 
divorce decree was ineffective, even though it had been 
signed by the Judge prior to the death of the party, when 
the death occurred during the interlocutory period and 
before the divorce was final. The Utah Supreme Court 
elaborated on this issue further in Nelson v. Davis, 592 
P.2d 594 (Utah 1979), when it held that the death of one 
of the parties during a divorce action abated the action, 
and the status between the parties, including their 
property rights, reverted to what it was before the action 
was filed. 
In this case, Farrell died on the 15th of August, 
1989. The Decree was entered erroneously due to 
Appellee's unawareness of her husband's death ten days 
earlier. That Decree was subsequently vacated, nunc pro 
tunc, and accordingly is void with literally no effect 
whatsoever. Even without the order vacating the Decree of 
divorce, the entire divorce action was abated by the death 
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of Mr. Farrell on August 15, 1989. 
Since the action was abated and the Decree of Divorce 
was void, Phyllis Farrell became the widow, and thus an 
heir, to the estate of Russell Farrell. The Court should 
so hold and affirm the ruling of the lower court. 
.II. 
APPELLANTS CITE INAPPLICABLE STATUTORY LAW AND CASE LAW 
Appellants city Utah Code Annotated Section 75-2-803 
(a) as the statutory law which determines that Appellee is 
not the surviving spouse of decedent. Appellants maintain 
that because the decedent stipulated to an entry of the 
divorce, the divorce should somehow be considered final, 
bringing Mrs. Farrell within the parameters of the 
statute. 
The facts in this case are clear and undisputed: 
there was no final decree of divorce in place at the time 
of the decedent's death, nor was there an interlocutory 
decree of divorce, or an order of any kind terminating the 
parties1 marital interest. 
Accordingly, not only is U.C.A. Section 75-2-803 
inapplicable to this case, but the case relied upon by the 
Appellants, Prudential Insurance Company of America v. 
Dulek, et.al, 655 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1981), is also 
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inapplicable and of no assistance. 
In Dulek the domestic court had already issued a 
Decree of Divorce at the time of the decedent's death. 
Dulek at 218. This must be compared to the case at bar in 
which no Decree of Divorce was entered. In Dulek the 
court's decision turned upon the following fact: 
The record establishes that Bonnie Dulek had 
participated in valid divorce proceedings which had 
yet to become final... By entering the separation 
agreement, and thereafter obtaining a Divorce Decree, 
Bonnie became a party to a valid proceeding (a 
divorce) in which the State Court entered and issued 
an Order purporting to terminate all property rights 
against the decedent, Chace Dulek." Id. at 220 
(emphasis added, parenthesis in the original). 
In Dulek, the Court held that the wife, undergoing a 
divorce, did not become an heir or a widow because an 
order had been entered terminating her status prior to the 
decedent's death. That important distinction 
differentiates Dulek from the case at bar and removes 
Dulek from the category of the cases previously cited 
which hold that the wife remains married even if a Decree 
is entered after the death of the husband. See also 
Linson v. Johnson, 575 P.2d 405 (KA 1978) and In the 
Matter of the Estate of Chandler, 431 N.E.2d 486 (IL 
1988). 
Appellants concede that that divorce decree entered 
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after the death of the decedent is void. (Appellantfs 
Brief at p.10). However, Appellants offer a rather 
tortured interpretation of Section 75-2-803 and its 
accompanying editorial comments in an effort to convince 
the Court that the Decree was void due to a mere 
jurisdictional defect and should be considered effective 
for the purpose of the statute. The Appellants do not 
specify the nature of the alleged jurisdictional defect, 
although they imply that the problem here is caused by the 
Corut's lack of jurisdiction and authority over a dead 
person. What the Appellants refuse to recognize is that 
the Divorce Decree is void in this case because one simply 
cannot terminate a marital relationship by a divorce when 
it has already been terminated by a death. The further 
language of the editorial comment cited by the Appellants, 
which states that "where there is only a legal separation, 
rather than a divorce, succession patterns are not 
affected", suggests that marital harmony between the 
husband and wife are not required in Order for the wife to 
be a widow and/or an heir. 
Appellants have failed to present any law or fact to 
support their position that Mrs. Farrell should not be 
considered a surviving spouse even though she and Russell 
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Farrell were legally married with all of the attendant 
marital rights and responsibilities, until his death. 
The children suggest that this is an equitable 
proceeding. Utah law, however, holds that Probate Court 
acquires its jurisdiction solely by statute. In re: Harris 
Estate, 105 P.2d 461 (Utah 1940). 
Appellants argue that it is unfair to have Mrs. 
Farrell declared the widow of the decedent. However, they 
provide no basis for this claim. The Appellant's 
allegations, as set forth in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in their appeal brief, attempt to guess at the motives and 
thoughts of the decedent, the Appellee, and the 
legislature. Yet, the Appellants offer no authority, 
testimony, or support for their assumptions. 
The reality is that Mrs. Farrell should be declared 
to be the widow of the decedent because that is the law 
and because she is the deserving party. Phyllis and 
Russell Farrell were married eleven years, during which 
time Phyllis moved with her husband numerous times, 
endured his frequent job changes and constant financial 
problems. During the time he was in Alaska, they 
corresponded often and obvious affection, 
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discussing their financial situations and the problems his 
children had caused in their marriage. Mrs. Farrell 
continued to pay both their debts and to manage their 
financial affairs up to and after Mr. Farrell's death. 
The Appellants, decedent's natural children, and the 
decedent had been estranged for several years prior to the 
decedent's death. The Appellants had never accepted Mrs. 
Farrell nor her marriage to their father. Now, the 
Appellants, who with rare exceptions, wanted nothing to do 
with their father during the latter period of his life, 
hope to gain monetary satisfaction from his death and seek 
to disinherit his wife of eleven years. 
It appears that Appellants are offended that Mrs. 
Farrell did not attend the first available default 
hearing. They make much of the fact that the divorce 
could have occurred at an earlier date an prior to the 
decedent's death. Whether or not the divorce could have 
taken place sooner is irrelevant. They have no basis to 
impugn Appellee's character by implying that she was 
somehow negligent by not getting divorced as soon as 
possible, as if she could foresee that her husband would 
pass away so unexpectedly. 
Finally, Appellants claim that it is unfair for the 
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Court to refuse to terminate the marital relationship 
retroactively where the decedent had signed a Stipulation 
and Consent. The Appellants argue that "the only 
impediment to a final decree was the passage of time, 
nothing more." (Appellant's Brief at p.12). Another 
obstacle to a final decree can be reconciliation and a 
dismissal of the action. Indeed the opportunity for 
reconciliation is one of the policies behind the statutory 
waiting period. 
.III. 
APPELLANTS HAVE FILED A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
states the following: 
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
goood faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing 
law. 
A) APPELLANTS1 APPEAL AND BRIEF ARE NOT GROUNDED IN 
FACT. 
Before the lower court, the Appellants submitted a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in which they made numerous factual allegations 
that were unsupported by the records. The Appellants 
submitted no affidavits or documents. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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provides, 
"Supporting an opposing Affidavit shall be made on a 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts that 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is confident to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith...When a Motion for Summary 
Judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts, showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so the 
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state as a numbered sentence or 
sentences of noted facts disputed." 
Nothing in the children's memorandum remotely 
complies with the provisions of Rule 4-501. Even those 
"facts" which may be obtained by the court taking judicial 
notice of the domestic file were not identified to that 
file. In others words, the "facts" set forth by the 
children are not facts as required to be set forth under 
the rules but are merely statements of counsel upon which 
the children may not rely in opposing a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires, 
"the judgment sought shall be entered forthwith if 
the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogaotres, 
and Admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law." 
Rule 56(e) requires, 
"when a motion for Summary Judgment is made and 
support as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest, upon the mere allegations where denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial, if he does not so respond, Summary 
Judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him." (emphasis added) 
In Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985), 
this Court said 
"...that when a Motion for Summary Judgment is made 
under the rule, the affidavit of an adverse party 
must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. We held that 
plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
defendants having failed to identify with specificity 
any material fact. 
Appellant's affidavits in the instant case are 
deficient for the same reasons. Affidavits reveal no 
evidentiary fact but merely reflect the affiant's 
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in regard to 
the transaction concerned." 
In the case before the lower Court there were 
literally no affidavits or other appropriate evidence 
presented to the Court in response to the Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Where in Treloggan 
ineffective affidvits were held to be insufficient to 
avoid Summary Judgment, here the Appellant's failure to 
submit any affidavits to support their unsubstantiated 
"facts" was certainly insufficient to oppose the motion. 
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Had the appellants wished additional time in which to 
submit affidavits, they were entitled to rely on the 
provision of Rule 56(f) which authorized continuance of 
the hearing on Summary Judgment pending the obtaining of 
such affidvits. No such relief was sought. 
At the lower level, this case was procedurally 
identical to Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 957 (Utah 1989), where the Court held that: 
"when the moving party has presented evidence 
sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and 
the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, 
the trial court is justified in concluding that no 
genuine issue of fact is present or would be a 
trial." 
Because the appellants presented absolutely no sworn 
evidence below, their was no conceivable circumstance 
under which they could hve avoided the appellee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This was particulary true in light 
of the fact that their stated "facts" includes, for 
example, statements such as the following: 
"following the execution by Mr. Farrell of the 
acceptance he moved to the State of Alaska and 
commenced full-time employment, not returning to the 
State of Utah"; 
"the only reason why the petitioner and the decedent 
were not divorced prior to his death was th inaction 
of the petitioner"; and 
"the decedent was not only corresponding with Phyllis 
but also corresponding with another lady and had 
promised to meet this other woman when he returned 
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from his fishing trip." 
(Appellant's Memorandum at pages 2 and 3) 
The lower court erred in considering Appellant's 
Memorandum where the factual allegations were unsupported 
in direct contravention of Rule 56. Accordingly, 
Appellant's Memorandum is not properly before this Court 
on appeal and hould not be granted any weight in the 
decision-making process. 
The Appellant's Brief should not be considered as 
well, since it cites, as support for the brief's factual 
allegations, the Appellant's own defective and improper 
Memorandum. 
Appellant's refusal to comply with proper procedure 
and to support their facts by the record results in the 
consequence that none of Appellants' facts are properly 
before the Court and cannot be considered. 
Appellants's appeal is not only without basis in fact 
due to substantial procedural error. Their appeal is also 
frivolous because the facts, as conceded by the 
Appellants, show that the Appellee and decedent were 
legally married at the time of his death and that the 
Divorce Decree entered subsequent to his death is void and 
ineffective. Yet Appellants have insisted in arguing the 
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issue further in a vain and expensive attempt to rewrite 
the history of the case. 
B) APPELLANTS1 APPEAL AND BRIEF ARE NOT WARRANTED BY 
EXISTING LAW. 
As discussed above, Appellants1 reliance on U.C.A. 
Section 75-2-803 is ill-founded since that statute applies 
only if a final order terminating the parties' marital 
relationship is in place at the time of the decedent's 
death. Since the divorce was not final in this case, the 
statute does not apply. 
Appellants fail to recognize or refute the existing 
law in Utah as set forth in Daly and Nelson. They rely 
on a federal case with facts that are crucially different 
than the fact situation in the case at bar. Appellants 
have not provided to this Court, nor did they before the 
Court below, any statutory law or case law that is on 
point and applicable which would survive a summary 
judgment motion or justify an appeal. 
C) APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PRESENTED A GOOD FAITH 
ARGUMENT AS TO WHY THE LAW PRESENTED IN UTAH SHOULD NOT BE 
FOLLOWED. 
Appellants have tried to prop up their appeal with 
unsupported and unsubstantiated claims and assumptions 
regarding the intent of the legislature, the policies 
behind the "surviving spouse" statute, and the thoughts of 
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the decedent. 
The Appellants1 attempt to persuade the Court that 
the decedent's nondependent adult children are more 
deserving and more just heirs than the decedent's aging 
wife of eleven years. 
Appellants' appeal cannot be considered to have been 
made in good faith where their claims are unsupported by 
the facts or by law, and without any justification 
presented to the Court for overturning the present law in 
Utah. 
D) APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD FOR DAMAGES AND 
TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
Appellants have forced Appellee to incur severe 
financial strain to protect her status as the widow of the 
decedent. As discussed above, Appellants' appeal is 
frivolous and baseless, without merit or justification in 
law or fact. 
Therefore, Appellee respectfully requests that Court 
to award her damages and the recovery of attorney's fees 
and costs and that a separate hearing be held for the 
limited purpose of determining the amount of attorney's 
fees and incurred by the Appellee in responding to 
Appellant's appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellee is the widow and heir of the decedent 
Russell S. Farrell. Appellee and the decedent were 
legally married at the time of decedent's death. The law 
in Utah, as set forth in the cases of Daly and Nelson, is 
that upon the death of a party, a divorce action abates 
and the status between the parties reverts to what it was 
before any action was filed. 
Therefore, the divorce decree entered after the 
decedent's death is void and without effect. 
Appellants have not submitted any statutory law or 
case law to support heir argument. The Appellants have 
failed to present any facts to support their position. In 
addition, what facts they have presented are unsupported 
by the record and are presented in a procedurally 
defective manner. Since their appeal is without any basis 
in law or in fact, it is frivolous. 
According, the Appellee should be awarded damages and 
an award for her attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
responding to this appeal. 
Wherefore, Appellee respectfully requests that the 
Court uphold and affirm the ruling of the Trial Court on 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and find that 
Appellee is the widow and heir of the decedent. Appellee 
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requests that the Court rule that Appellants have filed a 
frivolous appeal and that the Court award Appellee an 
award for damages and her attorney's fees and costs. The 
Appellee requests that Court remand this action to the 
lower court for a hearing on the limited issue of the 
amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred by Appellee 
and for a determination as to whether the Appellant or 
their counsel should pay said amounts. 
DATED this / 5- day of July, 1991. 
IT 
Attorney/for Appellee 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed to the following 
via first class mail, postage prepaid thereon, this jcT 
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Duane R. Smith 
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